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Abstract
Within the emerging new world order boundaries which
otherwise serve to delineate local narratives and values
are beginning to collapse. What happens in one place
cannot be isolated from global concerns. It is difficult for
societies to completely rely on themselves for survival and
social solidarity. As a direct consequence, developed
economies are pressuring weaker economies to further
open their boundaries. This presupposes a challenge – a
meta-narrative of some sort. It is the contention of this
paper that although values may vary from context to
context and with time, such variations do not preclude
the existence of cross–cultural assessment that defines
human progress and global solidarity.
Introduction
I have for quite sometime been attracted to the issues of universal
morality as a platform upon which the transcultural legitimation of knowl-
edge claims is possible. But this seems to suffer some setback because of
the insistence of some deconstructionists on the dislocation of metanaratives
or what Lyotard calls the illegitimate scheme for legitimizing knowledge
claims, insisting that recognition of universal values fails to respect diver-
sity of language games in terms of historical truths and ethnical account-
ability. This seems to belie the point of universalist. The unfolding events in
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the emerging new world order suggest to a large extent that boundaries
which otherwise serve as the locus of values priorities in diverse societies
and forms are beginning to collapse, responding  to the ever changing
pressure of international trends, which suggest that what happens in one
place cannot be isolated from global concerns.
The above appears a response to two isolated but related issues:
first, recall that the competitive world which human beings live today has
made it difficult for societies to completely rely on themselves for the sup-
ply of the basic ingredients of survival and social solidarity. Secondly, and
as a direct consequence of the above, the influence which developed
economies bring to bear on the weaker societies so to say, is enough to
pressurize them to open up boundaries with the assumption that it will
positively lead them out of the woods. (Ebijuwa, 2004). This presup-
poses a challenge – a metanarative of some sort. Deconstructionist, on
the other hand sees this as oppressive and destructive to norms and val-
ues of local narratives. No doubt local narratives gain support from the
claim that societies are not constituted in the same way. But this platitude
alone is insufficient to answer the basic question of survival inherent in
many developing societies today. (Ebijuwa, 2002). This goes to say that
the claims that local values are context dependent, for example, democ-
racy, does not lose touch with the fact that, although democracy may
respond to historical and cultural circumstances, it does not lose track of
its basic tenets, such as freedom, justice, fairness etc which gives democ-
racy its universal appeal. “And this is the reason when anybody’s right is
violated, it can be subjected to the scrutiny of world opinion (like the
gruesome murder of Ken Saro Wiwa and nine other Ogoni human rights
activists by General Sanni Abacha former military leader of Nigeria) when
that treatment violates widely recognize standards – the furtherance of
which has come to be conceived as an overriding obligation upon every-
body within and across societies” (Ebijuwa, 200:58). The argument here
then is that, although values may vary from context to context and with
time, such variations do not preclude the existence of cross – cultural
assessment which defines human progress and global solidarity. Before
we go into this, let us look at the platform upon which the arguments of the
proponent of local narratives are constructed.
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Platform for Local Narratives
The trust of the claim of the proponents of local narratives derives
from our quest in contemporary African to reflect on the Africa project
and thus embark on the search for a platform that would best account for
the needs and challenges of Africa in a more satisfactory manner. This
quest is associated with those held by some scholars in the social sciences
in terms of the ways social structures influence value judgments. Values
judgments, some believe, are determined by the traditions, customs, and
folkways of each society, which are not necessarily shared by every soci-
ety. As Sumner puts it, what is right, is determined by the folkways of each
society (Sumner, 190:446). If we add to this fact of cultural variation the
issue of how an individual’s values reflect those of his own social group
and time, we may then begin to question the universal validity of moral
claims. This is based on the claim that our moral attitudes and judgments
leant on our social environment. Even our deepest convictions about jus-
tice and the rights of man are originally nothing but the internalized views
of our societies. This reasoning is the source of the problems we find in
Africa and many parts of the world today. For, many are wont to use the
facts of the variation as a basis to affirm the superiority of one culture to
another.
The result of this ethnocentric attitude in many cases is as D.H.
Munro (1967:114) says, an intolerable excess of interference. This no
doubt will not only lead to the disruption of viable moral ideals in other
culture, it will in additional lead to the destruction of the mechanism for the
promotion and preservation of those moral ideas and ideals. This ethno-
centric attitude may be, as J.J. Kupperman points out, a combination of
two factors: “absolutism in ethics” (that is, the belief that something may
be right or wrong independently of what any culture or individual happens
to believe), and the belief that in fact one’s own culture has arrived at the
correct answers to existential problems. (1970:74).
The sense in the concern for tolerance is not difficult to see here.
Narrativists urge us not to speak of practices or beliefs as absolutely right
or wrong, but rather to speak of them as right or wrong, relative to a
culture or social context. Presumably, then, instead of worrying about
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whether certain customs are really right or wrong; we should say they are
right or wrong relative to a given people or culture.
What follows from this is the assumption that moral values cannot
be interculturally evaluated. Benedict puts this view clearly in her descrip-
tions of three cultures with great sympathy and perceptiveness. She sees
then as equally valid patterns of life which mankind has created for itself
from the raw materials of existence (1946:278). Each is selected among
human potentialities. Some potentialities she says can be realized at great
cost but if any society wishes to pay that cost for its chosen and congenial
traits, certain moral values will evolve with this pattern, however bad it
may be. This cannot be assessed by any external standard.
Benedict’s position raises as Otunbanjo observes, two related
issues. First, it challenges the claim that there is a universal, independent,
ethical standard in terms of which one can evaluate moral values in other
societies. It proposes that the assessment and explanation of any moral
judgment should be done within the framework of the society or culture to
which it applies (1979:149 – 162). The implication is that the moral norms
of any society are the standard. The claim then, as L.M. Himnam puts it is
that:
The standard against which criticism is possible  are internal to
the ways of life itself and are distinctive from those which are
found in other ways of life; with the consequences that there
are no common standards against which two different ways of
life may be compared to the advantage of one of them
(1983:341).
The assumption here is that moral ideas, principles and actions
are tied to other presuppositions in a society, which we can understand
after we have laid bare the systems of knowledge, values and symbols
that structure the mind of the people. In this way, each community be-
comes an autonomous arbiter of its meaningfulness and justification. This
presupposes, gratuitously though, that sets of such absolute presupposi-
tions are equal in number to existing cultures or societies.
This assumption poses a threat to the existence of universal mo-
rality. In fact, it rules out completely the existence and operation of those
normative patterns of behaviour which constitute shared human practices,
Ebijuwa  57
customs and institutions. It is the implications of, and the challenge posed
by, universal morality that will be our concern now. Before this, let us look
at the ground for the appeal of the quest for local narratives.
Appeal of Local Narratives
One of the reasons for the appeal of local narratives can be traced
to the role played by social and cultural factors in the development of
moral ideas. The issue here concerns the view that each culture is domi-
nated by control mechanism, the existence of which evolves a unique set
of regulatory ideas that shapes the individual into a unique kind of human
being. By this we mean that each culture is seen as a set of symbolic
devices for the control of human behavior and for giving the individual a
set of definitions of himself and of others. Through these devices the value
systems of each society gradually take shape. In the course of the devel-
opment of these values, the inhabitant of each society organize their expe-
rience into a coherent whole. The point here is not only to show that the
diversity of values are result of social experience of different cultures, but
also that these value are what characterize the identity of cultures. This
conscious effort of differentiation along the line of social experiences is
usually used to confer an inestimable value upon cultures and to justify
their claim to a separate existence.
What this suggests is the view that, where different societies are
conditioned by their ways of viewing themselves and interpreting their
place in history and nature, it is inappropriate to judge the beliefs and
practices of one form of life with the standard of another. An example of
this is provided by Benedict concerning the moral standards of the Zuni
and those of the Dobu islanders.1
Among the Zuni, we are told, the value system is based on the
pursuance of peace and orderliness. Aggressive behavior is not only dis-
couraged but morally disapproved and cooperation, as one would find in
most other systems, is morally approved. This picture is in contrast with
the moral values  of the Dobu islanders where aggression, promotion of ill
–will, strife, suspicion, fear and hatred between one another, are morally
judged differently. According to Benedict,
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All existence appears to him (the Dobuan) as a cut-throat struggle
in which deadly antagonists are pitted against each other in a
contest for each of the goods of life. Suspicion and cruelty are
his trusted weapons …he gives no mercy, and he asks for none
(OP.Cit 124)
Here, we must be careful not to assume from this that there is a
state of complete anarchy among the Dobuans. On the contrary, the treach-
ery and hostilities which are allowed and honored within the group are
surprisingly controlled and directed by law and custom. What this indi-
cates is that it is the way of life of the Dobuans which explain their cultural
identity in terms of which they characterize their lives in ethical terms. This
cannot be used as the yardstick to appraise the lives of say, for example,
the Zunis, whose social experiences are completely different from that of
the Doubans. This view is what most relativists usually use to support their
claims, namely, that the imposition of external values will not only amount
to intolerance and dogmatism, it is also, as earlier remarked by Munro,
what has provided relativism with much ethical appeal.
Problems of the Quest for Local Narratives
But in spite of its appeal, the quest for local values has some
problems some of which are discussed below. The first one concerns the
claim peculiar to proponent of local narratives that the moral ideals and
judgments of each society originate from its customs, folkways, traditions
etc. It is true that in our everyday conversation we use the word morals to
cover matters that may be brought under customs, folkways, traditions,
etc. So, in discussing the morals of a given group of people, we usually
refer to such things as the rules of marriage, sex conduct, their manner of
organizing mutual aid, and their system of reward and punishment. Things
of this kind will certainly reveal a lot about their values, but the point is that
not all these values would be moral values.2 There is a significant differ-
ence between customary values and moral values properly so called.
Whereas, one cannot contemplate moral values without a renewed sense
of universal obligation, values arising from customs may not involve this
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sense of universal obligation. Here, Wiredu gives an example:
An Akan living in Akan land is expected, as a matter of course,
to observe, for example Akan rule of greeting. It goes without
saying that other people living in other lands need not feel any
such obligation. On the other hand, whether you are a Ghana-
ian or an American or a Chinese or of any other nationality,
race or culture, truth-telling is an indefeasible obligation upon
you (1995:35)
The point here is to say that, while it is possible to envisage a
society without the rule of greeting elders, it is impossible to have a society
that is devoid of the moral rule of truth telling. On this consideration, truth
– telling would be binding on everybody. For if truth –telling were not
binding, and everybody could tell lies without hindrance, no one would
trust any one’s word and social life to use Wiredu’s  phrase would be-
come intolerably Hobbesian.
This is the source of the mistake of some relativists. They tend to
conflate the rules of customs with the rules of morality. So, when relativist
says that morality is relative what they may mean is simply that the
obligatoriness of custom is relative. Strictly speaking, however, the
obligatoriness of moral rules is unconditional. This unconditional nature
stems from the fact that moral rules unlike customs are not conditioned
responses to environmental stimuli; comprising the results of training and
of rewards and punishment in a given society as we can see from the case
of greeting in Akan society. Although, many customs are structured to
achieve the well being of societies, and we may supposes that some do
actually succeed in this. But this is not a moral fact. The reason is that,
there are plenty of rooms for variation in the efficiency of customs. A
custom that is good in one society may be considered bad in another
society. Or it may be good in a given society at a particular time without
being so in another time and circumstances.
This susceptibility to being overtaken by changing time, place and
circumstance is part of what distinguishes custom from morality. Yet, be-
cause there is, as already remarked, a broad concept of morality within
which custom has been assumed to be a part, it is easy for people, on the
basis of observation of the great variety of customs among the different
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cultures of the world, to conclude that morality is relative in the sense that
moral rightness consists in being approved by a given culture.
Another problem implicit in the assumption of relativists is associ-
ated with their appeal for tolerance. As we can see from the preceding
discussion on the relativist’s point about moral beliefs is that their exist-
ence depends on certain other beliefs of a society which provide the frame-
work within which human experiences is interpreted in its social and cul-
tural setting. As a result of this, and in particular, because moral beliefs
perform certain roles in the lives of the people, relativists claim that they
must be respected. In other words, whatever the nature of any moral
practice, for example, the killing of twins as was once practiced in Cala-
bar (Nigeria), it should be tolerated.
The question then is, if moral beliefs are to be understood in terms
of the role they play in the lives of the people and on that basis is tolerated;
does it mean that such beliefs are free from critical appraisals? Hedenius,
for example, noted that “the fact that for some reasons it is necessary to
tolerate a practice P, must regard P as morally right” (1981:131). Many
practices may be tolerated though we regard them as morally wrong. This
indicates that tolerance does not just entail the existence of a wide range
of beliefs and values, and the freedom of individuals and groups to fully
express their diverse beliefs, practices and life – stance, it also presup-
pose the possibility of change (Kurtz:1995:16). By this we mean that moral
beliefs are not static. The dynamism of moral beliefs is borne out of the
fact that, when such beliefs are in conflict with other beliefs, which as Ross
says, stand better, the test of a true moral reflection (Ross:1963:10), they
are “bound” to obey the forces of change.
Here, a moral conviction that stands the test of a true moral re-
flection will be that the existence of which is not only suitable to contem-
porary social life, but also whose beliefs and practices leads to the pro-
motion of human essence. This, therefore, explains the diversity of values
and how such values that is not in line with the “test of a true moral reflec-
tion can be appraised. Now, the question of the “distance” of a people’s
moral conviction from the promotion of human essence might pose a prob-
lem here; relativists are likely to argue that such judgments are personal
expressions of speakers. But this cannot lead us to how moral values can
be adequately assessed.
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The assessment of moral values here imply that one unprejudicially
see his own conception of values as that whose limitations can be re-
viewed when compared with others in terms of their adequacy in realizing
their goals. In other words, what tolerance requires is not that we endorse
all moral beliefs or conceptions of values however repugnant they may be,
but that we see our conception of values as being open to revision.
This is to show that the diversity of cultural beliefs and practices
does not preclude the possibility of cross cultural evaluation of moral val-
ues. The issue here is that, even if we grant that there is an unlimited
variety of mores occasioned by the diversity of values, there may never-
theless be reasons for preferring some to others. For example, it is pos-
sible to say on the score of happiness and satisfactory human relationships
that some “experiment in living”, to use Macbeth phrase, are more suc-
cessful than others (1970:103). On this consideration, it is possible for
some features of a society to be criticized and changed without necessar-
ily bringing down the “whole structure”.
We acknowledge the influence of anthropological and historical
findings on the position of ethical relativism. There is now a greater under-
standing of the impact of such findings on the moral beliefs of peoples in
different societies. However, it is important to note the need for shared
moral convictions if human society is to be stable. As Dorothy Emmet
remarks, “there are ways of carrying a certain amount of instability and of
resolving conflicts besides that of re-asserting beliefs in a single existing
set of beliefs” (1970:103). This partly depends on people being able to
question some features of their norms. There are situations where people
are unwilling to conform to what is traditional, that is, unwilling to change
what has been regarded as the given in their society. But this is not to
undermine the fact that morality, like culture, is not static. It is something
that changes from time to time inconsonance with the dynamics of human
struggles.
Here, relativists may concede that values and judgments do change
but most of them insist, however, that the criteria in terms of which they
are assessed should not be external to the forms of life of which they are a
part. This view is equally problematic. The reason is that, even if moral
beliefs, practices and judgments, are to be located in their context, this
does not mean that morality must remain so for the society to survive.
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Murdock for example, rejects the relativist’s claim that cultural elements
can only be understood in the context of the culture to which they belong
(1965:146).
Such claim, Murdock says, is destructive to comparative studies.
Secondly, Murdock rejects the view of Herskovits that given the equal
validity and dignity of all culture, no evaluation of norms should be made
across cultural boundaries. He rejects this because everywhere he sees
people changing their moral ideas, especially ideas that are no longer ex-
istentially beneficial.
People relinquish cannibalism and head hunting with little resis-
tance when colonial governments demonstrate the material ad-
vantages of peace. Such evidence indicates that different cul-
tural adjustments to similar needs are by no means of equiva-
lent utility or practical worth. Some must manifestly be supe-
rior to others in at least a pragmatic sense if they are always
chosen in preference to the latter when both alternatives are
available (Murdock: 1965:147-148).
Here, Murdock places choice at the heart of social change and
developments, believing that context-dependent value judgment do not
create room for change. Relativism, therefore, on this view, is part of what
Murdock calls the “conservatism which hope to arrest social change”
(Hanson, 1978:43).
However, the above claim by Murdock cannot be taken to mean
a general assertion of the superiority of some values over others; we must,
rather, take this claim to mean that there are certain values in some societ-
ies that satisfy basic human wants and needs, such as human survival and
the provision of conducive atmosphere for social cooperation, better than
others. This view, however, is only partially correct. For, there is more to
social values than the satisfaction of basic human wants and needs.
What one can infer from the above discussion is that Murdock
seems to be particularly interested in questions that concern the relative
ability of different societies to satisfy human wants or needs. Now, if question
of this nature were the only ones faced in societies, then Murdock would
have a telling argument against relativism. But there is more to know about
societal values beyond their ability to satisfy people’s wants and needs.
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One can ask about their logical structure; the way they presuppose, imply
or contradict each other in a complex cultural system.
Here, relativism is the only appropriate approach, for our con-
cern is with the intrinsic meaning of cultural values. The meaning here
represent what the people in a given culture do in fact think, believe and
aspire to. “Their ideology is forged in specific socio-historical circum-
stances and takes specific forms”. And this can be grasped by looking at
cultures in their own terms, in their logical relations with each other.
But this is the source of the problem. Cultures are not so perfectly
integrated to warrant such holism. Our point about relativism thus far does
not contain any claim that a people’s culture is impervious to the outside
world. In fact, as Lawuyi argues, to say that values are context –depen-
dent, is to create the illusion that we know everything about man and his
environment from the knowledge of ourselves (1992:47). This is because
cultures do overlap and societies with different cultures do interact with
and influence one another. On this consideration, we cannot legitimately
talk of any form of moral evaluation that is peculiar to a society. This is to
say that the localization of ideas cannot be the final word in any cultural
authority. This is because sometimes what happens in one society may
affect or restrict the activities of people in other societies – in which case
we cannot only say that cultures are local and separate, but that given the
fact of the inter – locking relationships of cultures, we cannot but be con-
cerned with the activities of people of other culture.
Let us now examine the reason for the appeal of ethical relativism.
Relativists reject any attempt at placing moral values on an evolutionary
scale in terms of criteria of values developed outside a society. They argue
that since cultures differ in the way they interpret their experiences and
because they operate with different assumptions about morality, a people’s
moral system can only be understood by unveiling those assumptions which
guide their interpretation of experience. And since different interpretations
suggest the reality of different cultural identities, no society can claim to
have the final word on the meaning of morality.
It is important to note here that, relativism has some merits. It is a
fact, for instance, that the interpretation of human experience vary from
one place to another. And that even within a society interpretation may
vary with time. Now, if interpretation of experiences vary in these ways
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then it should be correct to say that no way of interpreting human experi-
ences should be regarded as the given.
However, the trouble with the above view is not with the conten-
tion that social experiences vary. It is with the mistaken assumption that
the diversity of these experiences and their attendant variation of values
are sufficient to establish ethical relativism. This is because it is possible
for one to accept the facts of cultural variation and deny ethical relativism
without contradicting himself. W.T. Stace, for example, argues as follows
while rejecting the analysis presented by Benedict:
Ruth Benedict tells us that the Dobu islanders disagree with
(the) advice of Jesus Christ about loving your neighbour…she
seems to conclude that treachery and ill-will are, for the Dobu
islanders, good. My contention is that the Dobu islanders are
simply mistaken… People are often mistaken about what will
be good for the health of their bodies. That is why we have
moralists. The Dobu islanders need someone to correct their
…moral mistake (1950:211-212).
This is to say no matter how profound or great the differences in
the moral beliefs or our social experience may be, it is possible to hold
that some of these beliefs are true and others false. The fact that societies
differ about what is right and what is wrong, does not mean that one
society cannot have better reasons than another for holding to its views.
The question is how do we know which reason is better than the other?
Here, we believe that a society’s reasons are the results of a value system
that have as its priority the satisfaction of the needs of its people and the
promotion of human socio-economic cooperation (Ebijuwa, 2003). This
being the case, it will be “counter-productive” for relativists to use the
facts of the diversity of social experiences which expresses their cultural
self-identity to say that their value systems cannot be evaluated by criteria
of values alien to their social environment. In this sense, the appraisal of a
foreign cultural activity will involve what has been called “cultural cross –
breeding” (Oladipo, 1996:81). By this we mean that we take the good
aspect of a given cultural value and blend it with the good ones of another
society’s cultural values, for example, the technologically oriented way of
life, which are essentially beneficial to mankind (Ibid). However, the rec-
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ognition and adoption of the beneficial aspect of another cultures value
should not in any way be taken as the imposition of superior values. After
all, no society lives in isolation. And so cannot lead to intolerance and
dogmatism as some relativists are wont to believe. This being the case, it
will not be difficult to see that the existence of different social experiences
and their associated value systems does not eliminate the possibility of
cross – cultural assessment of values (Ebijuwa, 2006). In fact, Edmund
Burke is right when he observes that a state without the means of some
change is without the means of its own conservation.
Conclusion
Thus far, we have argued that moral values cannot be completely
relativised. And also that the evidence from anthropological findings re-
veal that value judgments are context – dependent. However, we have
also seen that the facts of this diversity of values cannot as Protagoras and
postmodernists thinkers have argued establish ethical relativism. For, it is
possible, as stated earlier, for a society to have a belief in a particular
value system and for that belief to be false. This being the case, then
universal morality is possible.
Endnotes
1 The Zuni Indians can be found in the Pueblos of New Mexico and the
Dobus on an island north of the eastern end of New Guinea. For further character-
ization of this groups of people – see R. Benedict.
2 I owe the distinction between customs and moral values to Kwasi Wiredu,
see his (1995) “custom and Morality: A comparative analysis of some African and
western conceptions of morals” in his Conceptual Decolonization in Africa phi-
losophy Ibadan: Hope publications, P.35.
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